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THE CONFUSION OF PHILIP MoRRIs: How THE
SUPREME COURT CAME TO HOLD THAT PUNITIVE
DAMAGES CANNOT BE USED TO PUNISH FOR
HARM TO NON-PARTIES, BUT THAT JURORS ARE
ALLOWED TO CONSIDER HARM TO NON-PARTIES
WHEN DECIDING TO IMPOSE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Anne Passino
I. INTRODUCTION
In Philip Morris USA v. Williams,1 the United
States Supreme Court examined the constitutional propriety
of a large punitive damages award levied against a defen-
dant tobacco company in favor of a single plaintiff. A jury
had awarded $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5
million in punitive damages to the widow of a heavy ciga-
rette smoker for her husband's smoking-related death be-
cause the tobacco company knowingly and falsely
promoted smoking as safe.2 The Court held that permitting
a jury to base any part of a punitive damages award upon a
desire to punish the defendant for harming non-parties
amounted to a taking of "property" from the defendant in
contravention to the Constitution's Due Process Clause.
3
In granting review of Philip Morris, the Supreme
Court attempted to clarify what a jury may properly con-
sider when determining a punitive damages award. Unlike
other recent punitive damages cases, the Court asked, inde-
pendently of whether the award could be considered
"grossly excessive," only whether such a large award to a
1 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
2 Id. at 1061.
3 Id. at 1060.
1
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single plaintiff4 offended due process. 5  The Court con-
cluded that although it is constitutionally acceptable for a
jury to consider the potential and actual harm to non-parties
as probative evidence of reprehensibility, a jury must not
use its verdict to punish potential or actual harm to non-
parties. 6 In at least the context of mass torts, Philip Morris
purports to satisfy the substantive due process concerns of
arbitrariness and unfairness with a procedural mechanism. 7
This synopsis argues that Philip Morris, which has
been characterized as a boon to both corporations and
plaintiffs, does no more than re-cast a "distinction without a
difference," 8 leaving jurors with little more guidance than
previous punitive damages jurisprudence provided. By
creating a procedural mechanism that variously permits and
prohibits jurors from using the same evidence in their cal-
culation of punitive damages, the Court has ensured that it
will continue to revisit and revise this area of the law.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE ANALYSIS
A. A Brief History of Punitive Damage
Jurisprudence
The modem era of Supreme Court punitive damag-
es jurisprudence began in 1991 when, in Pacific Mutual
4 Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, it should be noted that
a state statute would have required that the punitive damages awarded
to this single plaintiff be subject to a state statute that makes such
awards payable in whole or in part to the State, rather than to the pri-
vate litigant. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735(1) (2003)).
5 Id. at 1063.
6 Id. at 1064, 1065.
7Id. at 1065.
8 Editorial, Class Actions in Drag: The Supreme Court Splits More
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Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,9 the Court attempted to settle
the "long-enduring debate" about the propriety of punitive
damages. 10 Prior to this decision, the Court repeatedly
declined to address whether the Due Process Clause limited
punitive damages awards.1 Instead, trial courts and juries
were guided by the common law. 12 "Under the traditional
common-law approach, the amount of the punitive award
[was] initially determined by a jury instructed to consider
the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar
wrongful conduct."' 13 And, in large part due to the
longstanding history of this approach, the Court rejected
challenges that punitive damages necessarily violated due
process. 14
To buttress its conclusion that punitive damages are
not per se violative of either the Due Process or Excessive
Fines Clauses of the Constitution, the Court pointed to the
many "enactments during the period between 1275 and
1753 [that] provided for double, treble, or quadruple dam-
ages."'15  This ancient calculation of "reasonableness"
formed the basis for the Court's twentieth-century assertion
that an award four times the amount of the awarded com-
pensatory damages, "may be close to the line... [of] con-
stitutional impropriety."' 6  Although larger awards have
9 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
'0 Id. at8.
i1 Anthony J. Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on
Punitive Damages: Due Process Revisited After State Farm, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 423, 430 (2004).
12 Id. at 432.
13 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15.14 Id. at 40 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Historical acceptance of legal
institutions serves to validate them not because history provides the
most convenient rule of decision but because we have confidence that a
long-accepted legal institution would not have survived if it rested upon
procedures found to be either irrational or unfair.").
BMW of N. Ain, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996).
16 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24.
3
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since been upheld, the Court's due process analysis retains
its ratio-based common law roots.
B. The Court Acknowledges Due Process and
Sets Up a Three-Guidepost Test for
Excessiveness
In Haslip, the Supreme Court first acknowledged
that the Due Process Clause imposes at least some proce-
dural constraints on the size of punitive damages. 17 There,
because an instruction guided the jury's discretion 18 and
state common-law required judicial review 19 of the award's
excessiveness, the Court was satisfied that the defendant
had received procedural due process.
Substantive due process was addressed two years
later in TXO Productions Corp. v. Alliance Resource
Corp. In TXO, the Court upheld a punitive award that
was nearly 526 times larger than the compensatory award,
declining to find the award "grossly excessive., 2 1  "It is
appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm
17 Franze, supra note 11, at 433.
18 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19-20 ("The instructions thus enlightened the
jury as to the punitive damages' nature and purpose, identified the
damages as punishment for civil wrongdoing of the kind involved, and
explained that their imposition was not compulsory. .... ").
19 Id. at 20 ("[T]rial courts are 'to reflect in the record the reasons for
interfering with a jury verdict, or refusing to do so, on grounds of
excessiveness of the damages.' Among the factors... [for considera-
tion] are the 'culpability of the defendant's conduct,' the 'desirability of
discouraging others from similar conduct,' the 'desirability of discou-
raging others from similar conduct,' the impact upon the parties,' and
'other factors, such as the impact on innocent third parties."'). Judicial
review remains a required feature of punitive damages claims. See,
e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (striking down a
provision of the Oregon Constitution that prohibited - with limited
exceptions -judicial review of punitive damage awards for excessive-
ness).
20 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
21 Id. at 454,462.
4
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that the defendant's conduct would have caused to its in-
tended victim ...as well as the possible harm to other
victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior
were not deterred., 22  Justifying such a large departure
from the four-to-one ratio, Justice Kennedy noted that "a
more manageable constitutional inquiry focuses not on the
amount of money a jury awards in a particular case but on
its reasons for doing so."
23
Three years later, in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore,24 the Supreme Court reversed a punitive damages
award. In so doing, the Court articulated three "guide-
posts" to determine whether an award is unconstitutionally
excessive under the Due Process Clause such that the de-
fendant cannot be said to have "fair notice" of punishment
and penalty: (1) "the degree of reprehensibility" of the
defendant's conduct, (2) "the disparity between the harm or
potential harm suffered . . and [the] punitive damages
award," and (3) "the difference between this remedy and
the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases." 25 At least in part because the BMWjury had impro-
perly been permitted to consider similar, but lawful, out-of-
state conduct in its award calculation, the Court concluded
that the award was excessive. 26 The Court did not address
22 Id. at 460. In this case, the claim was brought in response to a failed
fraudulent scheme, so the Court opined that the ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages would be less "shocking" had the scheme
been successful. Id. at 462.
23 Id. at 467 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
24 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 562 (1996).
25 Id. at 574-75. In his dissent, Justice Scalia suggests that these "guide
posts" are worthless because, "the application of the Court's new rule
of constitutional law is constrained by no principle other than the
Justices' subjective assessment of the 'reasonableness' of the award in
relation to the conduct for which it was assessed." Id. at 599 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
26 Id. at 571, 573.
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whether a jury may consider out-of-state unlawful con-
duct.
27
C. Post-BMW Clarifications Leading up to
State Farm
With BMW, the Court had finally established stan-
dards for post-verdict review of punitive damages awards.
However, lower courts came to divergent conclusions about
how to interpret and implement the "guideposts," and the
Court was criticized for not having provided true guidance
and for leaving many questions unanswered. 28 Unfortu-
nately, the next punitive damages case did not enable the
Court to answer substantive questions about the guideposts,
though it did set the standard of review for appellate courts
"considering the constitutionality of the punitive damages
award."29 In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., the Court reasoned that because punitive dam-
ages are "quasi-criminal" and non-factual determinations,
30
appellate courts should apply a de novo standard of review,
as they do in "analogous cases" where deprivations of life,
liberty, and property are at stake. 31 The Court explained
27 Id. at 573 n.20.
28 Franze, supra note 11, at 428 n.29.
29 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
426 (2001).30 But see id. at 446, 445 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing (1) that "a
jury's verdict on punitive damages is fundamentally dependent on
determinations we characterize as factfindings and (2) that the proper
standard is abuse of discretion because of both the Seventh Amendment
and the differences between a trial court's experience in the courtroom
and an appellate court's removed vantage point).
31 Id. at 434. As in previous punitive damages cases, Justices Thomas
and Scalia dissented, taking the position that the Constitution does not
limit punitive damages awards; in this case, however, Justice Thomas
agreed with the majority that the proper standard was de novo while
Justice Scalia only conceded that de novo was the proper standard
6
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that de novo review is particularly appropriate in areas of
the law where the standards "acquire content only through
application," so that independent appellate review helps "to
maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles," and
"unify precedent' and 'stabilize the law.'
32
Then, in 2003, the Court decided State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,33 a case in
which a punitive damages award 145 times larger than the
compensatory damages award was held to be unconstitu-
tionally excessive under each of the BMW guideposts.
34
Although the Court found the case to be "neither close nor
difficult," 35 it clarified that to determine "reprehensibility,"
one should consider whether:
[T]he harm caused was physical as opposed
to economic; the tortious conduct evidence
an indifference to or a reckless disregard of
the health or safety of others; the target of
the conduct had financial vulnerability; the
conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and the harm was the re-
sult of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit,
or mere accident. 36
As these factors relate to similar, lawful out-of-state con-
duct with a "nexus" to the plaintiff, the Court stated that
such evidence of reprehensibility may be considered as
demonstrative of "deliberateness and culpability," but,
however probative, it may not be used to punish.37 Punish-
because it best comported with precedent from which he originally
dissented in favor of abuse of discretion. Id. at 443-44.32 Id. at 436.
33 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).34 Id. at 418.
35 /d. at 418.
36/d. at 419.
3 Id. at 422.
7
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ing for non-party harm would violate due process because
one plaintiffs claim would serve as proxy for improperly
arguing "the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims
against a defendant under the guise of reprehensibility
analysis ... *38
Finally, the State Farm Court reviewed the proper
standard of analysis for ratios of punitive to compensatory
awards and concluded that, "[s]ingle-digit multipliers are
more likely to comport with due process ... ,,39 Upward
departures may be possible, the court allowed, where (1) "a
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages," (2) "the injury is hard to
detect," or (3) "the monetary value of non-economic harm
might have been difficult to determine., 40 Combined with
the Court's latest clarification about ratio-calculations, for
three years, State Farm permitted the inference that unlaw-
ful out-of-state conduct and resulting harm to non-parties,
might be properly considered by a fact-finder and used to
increase punitive damages under the "reprehensibility"
guidepost.
III.PHILIP MORRIS'S PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Pre-State Farm Trial and Appellate Review
Mayola Williams, the widow of Jesse Williams, a
smoker, brought suit against Philip Morris USA for "negli-
gence and fraud, asserting a causal connection between
Jesse Williams' smoking habit and his death."'" At trial, a
jury found that Philip Morris, the manufacturer of the de-
ceased's favorite cigarette brand, had been negligent and
Id. at 423.
3 Id. at 425.
40 Id. at 425.
41 Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1167 (Or. 2006).
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had engaged in deceit.42 The trial judge rejected the defen-
dant's suggested instruction on punitive damages 43 and
instead instructed the jury that "[p]unitive damages are
awarded against a defendant to punish misconduct and to
deter misconduct," and "are not intended to compensate the
plaintiff or anyone else for damages caused by the defen-
dant's conduct."44  The jury then awarded the plaintiff
$821,000 in compensatory damages for the negligence and
fraud claims and $79.5 million in punitive damages for the
42 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
43 The proposed jury instructions read:
If you determine that some amount of punitive dam-
ages should be imposed on the defendant, it will then
be your task to set an amount that is appropriate. This
should be such amount as you believe is necessary to
achieve the objectives of deterrence and punishment.
While there is no set formula to be applied in reach-
ing an appropriate amount, I will now advise you of
some of the factors that you may wish to consider in
this connection.
(1) The size of any punishment should bear a reason-
able relationship to the harm caused to Jesse Wil-
liams by the defendant's punishable misconduct.
Although you may consider the extent of harm suf-
fered by others in determining what that reasonable
relationship is, you are not to punish the defendant
for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other per-
sons, who may bring lawsuits of their own in which
other juries can resolve their claims and award puni-
tive damages for those harms, as such other juries see
fit.
(2) The size of the punishment may appropriately re-
flect the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct -- that is, how far the defendant has departed
from accepted societal norms of conduct.
Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1068-69.
44 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
9
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fraud claim.45 The trial judge remitted the punitive damag-
es award to $32 million which, after both sides appealed,
was restored by the Oregon Court of Appeals to the full
$79.5 million found by the jury.46 After the Oregon Su-
preme Court denied review, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari and ordered that the case be remanded to
the Oregon Court of Appeals in light of its recent State
Farm holding.
47
B. The State Courts Attempt to Comply with State
Farm
Upon remand, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld
its prior findings, prompting the Oregon Supreme Court to
grant review. 48 There, Philip Morris argued that the jury
instruction on punitive damages made it likely that the
$79.5 million award was a punishment for harms to persons
other than the plaintiff, in violation of the Due Process
Clause. 49 Like the state appellate court, the Oregon Su-
preme Court rejected Philip Morris' arguments, finding the
punitive damage award not "grossly excessive" because the
Constitution does not prohibit a state jury from using puni-
tive damages to punish harm caused to non-parties by the
defendant. 50  Philip Morris then petitioned the U.S. Su-
preme Court for certiorari which the Court again granted.
45 Id. at 1061; Williams, 127 P.3d at 1171.
46 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. The defendant also argued that the nearly 100 to 1 ratio of the
punitive damages award to the compensatory damages award exceeded
the traditional and suggested maximum of 9 to 1 ratios that "are more
likely to comport with due process" because they demonstrate a "rea-
sonable relationship" between the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Id. at
1061 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-85
(1996); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425
(2003)).
'0 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1062.
10
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C. The Supreme Court Grants Review for the Second
Time and Establishes a New Rule
Philip Morris raised two issues in its appeal: (1)
whether "Oregon had unconstitutionally permitted it to be
punished for harming nonparty victims," and (2) "whether
Oregon had in effect disregarded 'the constitutional re-
quirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to
the plaintiff s harm."' 51 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
structured its analysis so that by answering the first ques-
tion, it did not need to answer the second question.
52
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer began with the
proposition that the purpose of punitive damages is to "pu-
nish unlawful conduct and deter its repetition," 53 but con-
cluded that there is "no authority supporting the use of
punitive damages awards for the purpose of punishing a
defendant for harming others." 54 As such, Philip Morris
holds that punitive damage awards must be examined under
a "constitutional standard" 55 that permits evidence of harm
to others to be used in the jury's assessment of reprehensi-
bility but that prevents such evidence from being used in
the jury's assessment of punitive damages.
" Id. at 1062.
52 See id. at 1063 ("Because we shall not decide whether the award here
at issue is 'grossly excessive,' we need now only consider the Constitu-
tion's procedural limitations.").
51 Id. at 1062.
54 Id. at 1063. To clarify, the Court says that State Farm permitted the
consideration of potential harm to the plaintiff alone and that BWM left
the question open, though "punitive damages calculations [described by
the Court as "error-free"] likely included harm to others in the equa-
tion." Id. at 1063.
55Id. at 1065.
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IV. "CONSTITUTIONAL TORT REFORM": MORE
GUIDELINES WITHOUT MORE GUIDANCE
A. Private Plaintiffs and the Problem of Im-
plementation
Philip Morris is the unfortunate heir of the prob-
lems inherent in previous Supreme Court opinions on puni-
tive damages. 56  Despite the evolving, complex standards
propounded by the Court to help evaluate punitive damage
awards for "gross excessiveness," reviewing courts still
have little more guidance than an "I know it when I see it"
standard.57 Because the Court has not formulated standards
that produce predictable results, 58 it must repeatedly revise
56 Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Tort Reform: Limiting
State Power to Articulate and Develop Tort Law-Defamation, Preemp-
tion, and Punitive Damages, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1189, 1244 (2006)
("The Court's recent punitive damages cases are, as a group, the least
consistent with the traditional model [of adjudicating cases]. They
provide little prediction force, tread the most oppressively on state
power, and, in general aspects, lack reasoned or persuasive analytical
bases.").57 In TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481
(1993), Justice O'Connor wrote in her dissenting opinion that:
In my view, due process at least requires judges to
engage in searching review where the verdict disclos-
es such great disproportions as to suggest the possi-
bility of bias, caprice, or passion. As Justice Stevens
observed in a different context, "one need not use
Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity -- 'I
know it when I see it' -- as an ultimate standard for
judging" the constitutionality of a punitive damages
verdict "to recognize that the dramatically irregular"
size and nature of an award "may have sufficient
probative force to call for an explanation."
In State Farm, the Utah Supreme Court attempted to apply the BMW
standards (which caused it to reinstate the $145 million punitive dam-
ages award), but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and not only
found the award excessive in light of the same standards but stated that
such a determination was "neither close nor difficult." State Farm, 538
12
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its substantive due process analysis which consequently
grows more nuanced with each case. Paradoxically, these
are nuances that Supreme Court justices 59 and law profes-
sors 60 struggle with but that jurors must implement.
As a result of the confused precedent, cries for fur-
ther "tort reform" are frequently the response to large puni-
tive damages awards. 6 1 However, to contextualize the size
of the awards and to understand the difficulty that the Court
faces in crafting true reform, one must first accept that
when a defendant is a major player in the globalized econ-
omy and perpetrates a harm on countless people, this is a
very different claim than that with which traditional negli-
gence analysis dealt. 62  So, although reform has been
sought through state and federal legislatures, in cases like
Philip Morris, the U.S. Supreme Court has also been in-
volved in "constitutional tort reform."
Judicially-initiated "tort reform" is perhaps best un-
derstood as the Court's attempt at checking the theoretical-
U.S. at 418. Similarly, when the Supreme Court remanded Philip
Morris to the Oregon Supreme Court with directions to reevaluate the
$79.5 million punitive damages award in light of State Farm, the Ore-
gon Supreme Court found the full amount justified under U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and found the
award violated due process. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1060.
59 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60 Posting of Ethan Leib to PrawfsBlawg,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/02/punitives-and p.h
tml (Feb. 21, 2007, 04:10 EST).
61 See, e.g., Franze, supra note 11, at 423 ("A jury recently awarded a
single plaintiff $28 billion in punitive damages. That's billion, as in
nine zeros-all to one person. Given the frequent reports of multimil-
lion dollar verdicts, it is easy to become desensitized to 'skyrocketing'
F unitive damages awards.").
See Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages:
Why State Farm Won't Be the Last Word, 37 AKRON L. REV. 779, 811-
12 (2004) ("In applying the tenets of the modem concept of due
process to the frequent and often large punitive damage awards im-
posed by state courts today, the Court has found it necessary to create a
substantial new body of constitutional law.").
13
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ly unlimited liability to which individual defendants like
State Farm and Philip Morris are subjected when each
victim of a mass tort is allowed to bring a separate action
against a defendant corporation. Ideally, a balance should
be struck which would permit individual victims of mass
torts to have their "day in court" but which would also try
to protect defendants from arbitrary, excessive punishments
and "civil double jeopardy." 63 Commentators disagree as
to whether Philip Morris helps resolve this paradox of
scale 64 and in whose favor.
65
The practical issue the Court faced in Philip Morris,
then, was how to deal with evidence of aggregate harm to
non-parties when such harm formed the basis for the plain-
tiffs suit. In consumer-manufacturer suits, the Court had
63 Cf. BMW, 517 U.S. at 592-93 ("Some economists... have argued for
a standard that would deter illegal activity causing solely economic
harm through the use of punitive damages awards that, as a whole,
would take from a wrongdoer the total cost of the harm caused....
Larger damages might also 'double count' by including in the punitive
damages award some of the compensatory, or punitive, damages that
subsequent plaintiffs would also recover.") (Breyer, J., concurring).
64 Douglas W. Kmiec, Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court Loses Its
Unanimity, SLATE, Feb. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2160286 ("[The
opinion] is not an example of clarity. It is, instead, what happens when
you're lucky enough to be in a position to delegate to others the imple-
mentation of unworkable rules.").
65 Compare Editorial, Shielding the Powerful, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2007, at A20, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/opinion/21wedl.html?ei=509
("[The decision] is a win for corporate wrongdoers. It stretches the
Constitution's guarantee of due process in a way that will make it
easier for companies that act reprehensibly to sidestep serious punish-
ments."), with Editorial, Reigning in Juries, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007,
at A18, available at
http://www.latirnes.coninews/printededition/asection/la-ed-
tobacco22feb22,1,5904297.story ("The U.S. Supreme Court went
further this week - though not far enough - in reigning in juries in civil
cases that award outlandish punitive damages .... Breyer has brought
some clarity to a confused area of the law.").
14
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to decide how large a role evidence that Philip Morris pro-
duced and marketed cigarettes to more people than Mr.
Williams should play in Mr. Williams' private suit against
Philip Morris. The Court's solution is to allow the evi-
dence to be presented but to guide the jury's discretion and
thereby prevent the jury from holding a defendant account-
able for the entire universe of the defendant's harmful con-
duct. Evidence of harm to non-parties may be used, the
Court holds, to show reprehensibility; it may not be used,
however, "to punish a defendant directly on account of
harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties."
' 66
There is, however, a "practical problem' 67 created
by the Philip Morris holding: how will a reviewing court
know if the jury did, in fact, use the properly admitted
evidence for an improper purpose? Without specifying the
appropriate procedure, the Court cautions that states must
"provide some form of protection" in the form of proce-
dures that prevent "an unreasonable and unnecessary risk of
any such confusion occurring. ' 68 This will not be an easy
task. The jury instruction proffered by Philip Morris but
ultimately rejected by the trial court judge contained what
would turn out to be the majority's distinction, but Justice
Ginsburg warns that, "A judge seeking to enlighten rather
than confuse surely would resist delivering the requested
charge. ' ,69 If this is true, it would appear that rather than
buttressing procedural safeguards, Philip Morris further
entrenches the Court in its position of fighting excessive




66 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
67 Id. at 1065.
68 Id. at 1065.
69 Id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70 Cf. Editorial, Class Actions in Drag: The Supreme Court Splits More
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Large punitive damages awarded to individual
plaintiffs are the most susceptible to being overturned post-
Philip Morris because the Court did not provide adequate
guidance about what safeguards will pass constitutional
muster. Even-perhaps especially-if the jury is given in-
structions based on the Court's own language distinguish-
ing between reprehensibility and punishment, defendants
will rightfully argue that any evidence of large-scale harm
offered in one aspect of the trial will likely bleed over into
the jury's determination of punitive damages.
B. Philip Morris May Require Class Actions to
Punish Corporate Wrongdoing
Philip Morris is also significant because it may
mark the beginning of the constitutionalization of class
actions for mass tort lawsuits. By prohibiting juries from
punishing for harm to "strangers to the litigation," 72 the
Court effectively holds that aggregate harm may only be
punished when a critical mass of victims bring a joint
suit.
73
As the author of Philip Morris, Justice Breyer em-
phasizes procedural and, arguably, 74 quasi-substantive, due
(arguing that the Court's reliance on judicial discretion rather than
tooting decisions in the Constitution improperly privileges the judiciary
over other branches).
71 Douglas W. Kniec, Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court Loses Its
Unanimity, SLATE, Feb. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2160286.
72 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
73 In addition, under the Philip Morris rule, it is possible that any harm
that resulted from Philip Morris' conduct that was not victim-specific
(like an increase in teen smoking over a period of time) could not be
F4unished.
See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("It
matters not that the Court styles today's holding as 'procedural' be-
cause the 'procedural' rule is simply a confusing implementation of the
16
3:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 197
process concerns like adequate notice and equal application
of the law. A preview of the opinion's procedural perspec-
tive can be seen in Justice Breyer's BMW concurrence. 75 In
the name of procedural due process, 76 Justice Breyer takes
an individualized perspective of harm, so that the scope of
Philip Morris' harmful conduct is relevant to the Court only
insofar as it affects the present plaintiff. Thus, the Court
does not make analytical adjustments to the procedural due
process formula to compensate for the unique relationship
between consumers and manufacturers, a relationship
where harm accrues in individuals despite the fact that
companies do not specifically target individuals, except
insofar as each individual forms an indistinguishable part of
the collective consumer class.
In TXO, the Court had suggested that "It is appro-
priate to consider . . . the possible harm to other victims
that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not
deterred., 77 In order to overrule TXO and BMW,78 the Phi-
lip Morris Court imported language from Lindsey v. Nor-
substantive due process regime this Court has created for punitive
damages").
75 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 562, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("This constitutional concern [that there be legal standards
for punitive damages], itself harkening back to the Magna Carta, arises
out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life, liberty, or
property, through the application, not of law and legal processes, but of
arbitrary coercion.").
76 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (naming the "fundamental due
process concerns" to be "risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty and lack of
notice").
77 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993).78 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (arguing that TXO and BMW do not
conflict with the Court's current holding). But see Posting of Dan
Markel to PrawfsBlawg,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/02/philipmorrisu.ht
ml (Feb. 20, 2007, 16:40 EST) ("The Court today invokes TXO and
BMW as support or silence for its position that harm to non-parties
may not be considered other than to determine reprehensibility. This is
only possible by ignoring the language quoted above from TXO.").
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met:79 "[T]he Due Process Clause prohibits a State from
punishing an individual without first providing that indi-
vidual with 'an opportunity to present every available de-
fense."' 80 Lindsey involved a challenge to a landlord-tenant
statute. 81 Referencing language from such a small-scale
dispute involving no punitive damages does not appear
apposite to a claim like that in Philip Morris which spanned
the twentieth century and affected millions of consumers.
Although it is true that Lindsey is often invoked by defen-
dants in large class actions, Philip Morris is the fist time it
has appeared in the Court's punitive damages cases. 82
The Court's use of Lindsey could suggest that plain-
tiffs like Mrs. Williams cannot avoid procedural due
process violations by joining as many parties as possible to
the suit, because if there are too many co-plaintiffs, a de-
fendant can argue that any punitive damages will have to be
based on statistical evidence and that statistics and formulas
of damage to aggregate plaintiffs do not enable defendants
to present "every available defense." 83 Given these consid-
erations, the practical significance of the Court's reliance
on Lindsey will depend on how broadly or narrowly the
79 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972).
'0 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (quoting Lindsey, 405 U.S. 66).
The Court explained that if Philip Morris were punished for harm to
non-parties, it could not defend by showing that the victim was not
entitled to damages "because he or she knew that smoking was danger-
ous or did not rely upon the defendant's statements to the contrary. Id.
at 1063. However, this argument ignores that punitive damages are to
punish and deter wrongful conduct and that in this example, Philip
Morris' conduct was deceptive regardless of whether individual smoke-
rs were deceived.
1 Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 58 (quoting from a case in which a surety
company claimed a due process violation because of lack of notice of a
bond hearing).
82 Posting of Mark Moller to Cato @ Liberty,
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2007/02/21/
hilip-morris-v-williams-and-class-actions (Feb. 21, 2007, 14:07 EST).
See generally id. (analogizing from Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474
F.3d 1214 (9th Cir.2007)).
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language of "every available defense," is read by the Court.
Thus, for now, it would appear that in order to effectuate
the punishment and deterrence purposes of punitive dam-
ages, plaintiffs must unite as a class, but a class that is not
too large that individual defenses cannot still be offered.
C. The Effect of the Changing Face of the Su-
preme Court on Punitive Damages
Justice Stevens, the author of Cooper Industries,
BMW, and TXO, dissented in Philip Morris. In his dissent,
Justice Stevens refers to the majority's holding as a "novel-
ty" whose "nuance eludes" him. 84 The proper analysis, he
suggests, would acknowledge the separate purposes of
compensatory and punitive damages, because, "To award
compensatory damages to remedy such third-party harm
might well constitute a taking of property," 5 but that "pu-
nitive damages are a sanction for the public harm the de-
fendant's conduct has caused on threatened., 86 His dissent
is significant not only because Justice Stevens is the oldest
member of the Court and the author of three major punitive
damages decisions of the 1990's, but also because Justice
Stevens had been part of the State Farm majority that em-
phasized "single-digit"8 7 ratios as the measure of constitu-
tionality; here, by comparative omission, he would have
held the Philip Morris one hundred to one ratio acceptable.
With the replacements of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor,
it is possible that higher ratios, even where the compensato-
ry damages are as high as in Philip Morris, might be okay
84 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1066-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
86 Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). By compari-
son, Justice Thomas dissents because he characterizes the majority's
holding as pretending to be procedural when it is "simply a confusing
implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has
created for punitive damages." Id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
87 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,425 (2003).
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(so long as the jury does not consider extra-punitive infor-
mation).
Three other justices dissented in Philip Morris, but
none joined Justice Stevens' reasoning. Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Thomas and Scalia, accepted
the majority's distinction as cogent but found that the State
properly guided the jury's discretion in this case.88 In ef-
fect, then, eight of nine justices agreed to constitutionalize
another element of punitive damages analysis. Highlight-
ing the ideological inconsistencies 89 so prevalent in puni-
tive damages cases and getting a jab in at her colleagues,
Justice Ginsburg proclaimed that she would, "accord more
respectful treatment to the proceedings and dispositions of
state courts that sought diligently to adhere to our changing,
less than crystalline precedent."
' 90
As for the newest members of the Court, because
Philip Morris both sets aside a jury-formulated, state court-
sanctioned $79.5 million judgment and further constitutio-
nalizes punitive damages, it is perhaps unexpected that
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Brey-
er's majority opinion. The commentators are split on the
significance of the newest justices' alignment with the
majority: some claim it "demonstrate[s] their awareness
that when punitive-damage awards grow large enough, real
issues of justice and fairness (and thus due process) are
implicated," 91 while others chide the conservative justices
" Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).89 For another inconsistency regarding the principles of federalism and
comity, procedural due process seeks to minimize "the risk that puni-
tive damages awards ... impose one State's (or one jury's) policies
(e.g., banning cigarettes) upon other States," id. at 1064, but in the
name of quashing arbitrary punitive damage awards, the Court over-
turned a judgment that the highest court in Oregon upheld. As such,
the Court privileged a federal-level consistency among the states'
awards over federalism itself.
90 Id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
91 Editorial, Class Actions in Drag: The Supreme Court Splits More
Differences on Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2007, at A16,
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for disregarding the "bedrock conservative policy that leg-
islatures, not judges, make these policy calls." 92 In this five
to four split decision, Justice Kennedy appears to have
broken the tie, as has become his wont on the Roberts
Court. Interestingly, two conservative and two liberal jus-
tices joined the majority while two conservative and two
liberal justices dissented. As the hypothesized tie-breaker,
Justice Kennedy, the author of State Farm, may have
joined the majority on the basis of finding the ratio of com-
pensatory to punitive damages excessive. Alternatively,
Philip Morris may truly signal a new course for punitive
damages led by the newest members of the Court.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Brennan's concern that "punitive damages
are imposed by juries guided by little more than an admoni-
tion to do what they think is best," 93 was articulated before
the Supreme Court attempted to guide juries' discretion,
but after nearly twenty years of trying, juries are now
guided by a combination of confusing directions with fine
distinctions. Philip Morris, an opinion untried by applica-
tion, appears to favor (1) corporate defendants, by limiting
the evidence that individual plaintiffs can use to bolster
punitive damage awards, and (2) classes of plaintiffs, by
not ruling that the $79.5 million award was per se exces-
sive, so long as the jury's discretion was guided. Like
previous punitive damages cases, Philip Morris grabbed
available at
http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id=l 10009694.92 Douglas W. Kmiec, Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court Loses Its
Unanimity, SLATE, Feb. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2160286.
93 Anthony J. Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on
Punitive Damages: Due Process Revisited After State Farm, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 423, 432 (2004) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ver-
mont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989)).
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headlines with its multi-million dollar reversal of fortunes,
but the true significance will likely be more subtle as lower
courts attempt to implement the Court's holding.
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